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Executive Summary 
State-run retirement plans for non-covered private sector employees are a rapidly 
growing area of state policy. Since 2010, the majority of states in the U.S. have moved to either 
examine, enact, or implement these plans. This policy intends to increase private savings in an 
effort to reduce future reliance on public assistance and Social Security.  Despite the current 
public policy interest, there is a lack of research evaluating the impact of plans or common state 
characteristics that are associated movement in this policy area. This capstone focuses on 
answering the latter question. Using state-level demographic, pension, welfare, and policy data, 
this paper statistically analyzes which factors may influence states’ movement to examine state-
run retirement plans and which factors may play a role in states enacting these plans.  
Key findings include:  
● States with higher percentages of their populations living at 100-149% of the poverty 
level have a higher probability of seeing a state-run retirement plan proposed, studied, or 
enacted.  
● States with Democratic governors have a higher probability of seeing a state-run 
retirement plan proposed or studied.  
● States with higher poverty rates and higher percentages of their populations living below 
100% of the poverty level have a decreased probability of seeing a state-run retirement 
plan proposed, studied, or enacted.  
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Problem Statement 
The United States’ aging population presents a conundrum for public policy, government 
bodies, families, and the retirees themselves. Although not the first generation to retire, the baby 
boomer generation is the largest American generation to retire thus far. As they depart from the 
workforce, baby boomers leave behind smaller generations to continue to pay much-needed 
payroll and income taxes to fund government expenditures. Additionally, many baby boomers 
can expect an unprecedented length of time in retirement. The average lifespan in the U.S. has 
increased dramatically since the beginning of the 20th century; however, the average American 
does not have enough saved for an elongated retirement and long-term care (Fottrell, 2018). The 
difference between an American’s average savings and the estimated cost of retirement and care 
causes great concern about the future of retirement for baby boomers and following generations.  
Moreover, in 2019 the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) testified before 
the Senate Special Committee on Aging regarding the retirement system in the U.S. The concern 
about the state of retirement is well-documented (Gallop, 2018; GAO, 2019; Health and 
Retirement Study: Aging in the 21st Century, 2017; The New School, 2017). The GAO’s 
testimony builds upon this concern with a clear overview of the three “pillars” that represent the 
primary sources of retirement income: Social Security, employer retirement plans, and private 
savings. Balancing these income sources is necessary; overreliance on any one source can 
threaten its financial solvency, whether that source is a government program, private businesses, 
or an individual. Decreasing the financial solvency of any one of these sources has ripple effects 
for the entire retirement system. Consequently, it was troubling that the GAO’s testimony noted 
that many future retirees face financial stress due to a lack of personal savings and the likelihood 
that Social Security may not be sufficient to meet their needs. Their research also indicated that 
many lower-income workers do not have access to a retirement plan. State-level research has 
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found similarly troubling statistics. For instance, an analysis conducted by the Kentucky Center 
for Economic Policy (KCEP) showed that Social Security was the only source of income for 
35% of Kentuckians 65 or older (Spalding, 2016). Additionally, Social Security represented half 
or more of the total income for most Kentuckians 65 or older (Spalding, 2016). While income 
levels and types vary by state, the research conducted in Kentucky echoes the concerns listed in 
the GAO’s report to Congress.  
 Consequently, states are searching for ways to ensure their citizens are more prepared for 
retirement. One identified group at risk for low retirement savings is private sector employees 
whose employers offer no retirement plans. According to the Pew Charitable Trust, “thirty-five 
percent of private sector workers 22 and older do not work for an employer that offers a defined 
contribution plan or a traditional defined benefit plan.” Thus, several states are exploring state 
run retirement plans where the state sets up a retirement plan in which non-covered private sector 
employees can enroll (Tergesen, 2019). While most states have examined this course of action, 
only ten states have enacted programs (Georgetown University Center for Retirement Initiatives, 
2019). This capstone analyzes demographic characteristics of these ten states to discern the most 
prominent characteristics that predict enactment of state-run retirement plans. Additionally, this 
capstone analyzes the same characteristics for all states that have considered legislation and 
proposals for state-run retirement plans. Understanding the characteristics at work may be crucial 
for other states considering these retirement plans or for advocacy groups who want to develop 
initiatives regarding this policy.  
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Background 
Timeline 
 State-run retirement plans started developing in 2012. For the first few years, only a few 
states, such as Massachusetts, California, and Oregon, enacted or even considered this policy 
area. However, significant policy movement started in 2015: three other states enacted programs 
and the number of states examining legislation more than doubled. Since then, the majority of 
states have considered this policy area, and ten states have enacted programs through legislation 
or implemented working programs (Center for Retirement Initiatives, 2019). The progression of 
state-run retirement plans from 2010-2017 is shown in a series of maps found in Appendix A.  
State-Run Retirement Plans 
 A state-run retirement plan is a state-level plan for private sector employees who are not 
covered by an employer retirement plan. This is a completely new category of plans that are 
separate from public pensions for government employees and private-sector provided plans. For 
state-run plans, states select the plan type, the infrastructure, and administrative authority (Center 
for Retirement Initiatives, 2018). More specific details are up to the states and depend on a 
combination of state and federal policy. The desired outcomes of such retirement plans are to 
increase private savings for lower-income workers and to decrease future government program 
spending (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2018). While both goals appeal to states, they must also 
consider their administrative capacity to oversee such programs. 
 So far, states have enacted or considered four plan types: auto-IRAs, voluntary IRAs, 
Multiple Employer Plans (MEPs), and voluntary marketplaces (Center for Retirement Initiatives, 
2018). Auto-IRA plans require eligible employers to enroll in the state plan if the employers do 
not already offer a plan. However, employees can opt out of enrollment. Voluntary IRAs make 
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employer enrollment optional. Both utilize tax deductible payroll deductions from employees; 
employers cannot contribute to IRAs (Center for Retirement Initiatives, 2018). MEPs are 401(k)s 
or other pension plans where all assets in the employer plan are congregated to pay for benefits 
and costs (Morse & Antonelli, 2017). Employers can contribute to these retirement plans and 
must play a more involved role than in the IRA plans (Center for Retirement Initiatives, 2018). 
Marketplace plans operate similarly to the Affordable Care Act health insurance marketplace. 
The state establishes the retirement plan marketplace, enabling employers to connect with private 
sector retirement providers (Center for Retirement Initiatives, 2018). The state evaluates 
providers before allowing marketplace access, but the employer must then determine the actual 
selection (Center for Retirement Initiatives, 2018).  
ERISA 
 Additionally, states must consider the Employer Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA). Congress established the ERISA in 1974 in order to protect employees participating in 
private sector employee benefit plans (Morse, 2014). Although government benefit plans are 
exempt from ERISA regulation, state-run retirement plans are not necessarily exempt since they 
enroll private sector employees. States with exempt plans institute original plan details whereas 
non-exempt plans must comply wholly to ERISA regulation that preempts state law (Morse, 
2014). The determination of exemption versus non-exemption ties into the plan design, the 
extent of employer involvement, and employee control. Given the limited employer role and the 
employee’s ability to opt out, IRA plans are exempt from ERISA regulation. MEPs, however, are 
not exempt due to the employer role in contributions and plan details. Marketplaces are exempt 
because states do not play an active role in enrolling or administering plans. Rather, they are only 
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responsible for setting up and maintaining the marketplace. Private sector plans operating within 
the marketplace, however, would comply with ERISA (Center for Retirement Initiatives, 2018).  
Thus, the state’s level of participation can vary. For IRA plans, states are heavily 
involved in administration, implementation, and communication of programs. MEPs require 
states to name a plan sponsor and fiduciary. In marketplace plans, states set standards for private 
sector plans and establish the marketplace itself (Center for Retirement Initiatives, 2018). So far, 
the auto-IRA model has proven to be the most common choice for states; five out of ten of the 
enacted plans are auto-IRAs (Center for Retirement Initiatives, 2018). Given the exemption from 
ERISA regulation and the simplicity of the IRA structure, this is not a surprise. Furthermore, 
auto-IRAs lead to increased participation, even with the option to opt out (Morse & Antonelli, 
2017)(AARP, 2016). Thus auto-IRAs appear to be a promising policy solution. 
Concerns 
 At the same time, different concerns have been expressed about the nature of state-run 
retirement plans. Some researchers argue that these plans could hurt low-income workers since 
funds would be diverted from paying current debt (Evermore, 2019). Other organizations and 
researchers voice concerns about the compulsory nature of these programs, the employer burden, 
and the structure of these programs (John & Antonelli, 2017). While this paper’s purpose is not 
to address such criticism, it is important to note this commentary because there are divided 
opinions regarding the selection of state-run retirement plans. Although they are an important 
and current policy issue, there are differing perspectives on their viability as a retirement 
solution.  
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Current Response 
 Nevertheless, some states have implemented state-run retirement plans and have already 
seen promising results. In Oregon, 82% of the public supports OregonSaves, the state’s auto-IRA 
plan. More than 44,000 employees have enrolled, and the average savings rate is around 5.2% 
(Read, 2018). In California, researchers at UC-Berkley have examined the separate and 
combined effect of the state’s auto-IRA plan and the recent state minimum wage increase. 
Researchers found that the auto-IRA plan has the potential to increase retirement incomes for 
both low-income workers and middle-income workers (Rhee, 2017).  
Policy Diffusion 
 It is difficult to find literature explaining the policy diffusion behind state-run retirement 
plans. Additionally, identifying focusing events leading to the creation of state-run retirement 
plans is also difficult. The best candidate for a focusing event is President Obama’s myRA 
program that ran from 2015 to 2017. President Obama announced the myRA program in his 
2014 State of the Union address, and rolled out the federal program in 2015 (Bennett & 
Prinzinger, 2014) (Vinnik, 2018). The myRA program provided a way for workers with no 
access to a retirement plan to save for retirement by creating voluntary Roth IRAs that employers 
could enroll in order to allow their workers to contribute through their paychecks (Powell, 2017).  
However, the federal program failed to reach its desired impact; only 20,000 individuals 
enrolled even though the program cost $70 million to run (Leonhardt, 2017) (Powell, 2017). 
President Trump’s administration closed the program in 2017 due to the analysis of the 
program’s high cost and low enrollment numbers (Vinnik, 2018). Yet, President Obama’s 
announcement and rollout of this program may have served as a focusing event for states. 2015 
was also a year of significant movement in the state-run retirement plan policy area; the presence 
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of the myRA program probably brought the issue to states’ attention and motivated some to 
examine the program concept more seriously. Further, despite the closure of the myRA program, 
states have continued with their efforts to offer similar retirement plans at the state level to help 
the same private sector population save for retirement.  
Literature Review 
Since activity in this policy area began only seven years ago, and since only ten states 
have enacted plans so far, state-run retirement plans are still very new (State Initiatives 2019: 
New Programs Begin Implementation While Others Consider Action, 2019). Of these ten states, 
only California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Washington have fully functioning 
programs with enrolled employees. Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and 
Vermont are still developing programs. Most existing literature, therefore, discusses the 
legislation leading to these plans, explores the potential challenges or benefits of these plans, or 
tracks the progress of such plans.  
 Due to the lack of literature, some states have conducted their own studies regarding the 
need for state action and the financial feasibility of state-run retirement plans. In 2014, Utah 
commissioned a study to examine the financial preparedness of retirees and the effect of 
increased savings rates on the general public (Goodliffe, et al, 2015). While the purpose of the 
study was not to endorse state-run retirement plans, the study did illuminate the need to increase 
retirement savings opportunities. The KCEP released a report in 2016 that specifically called for 
a state-run retirement plan in response to state data on the lack of employer-sponsored retirement 
plans and on seniors’ reliance on Social Security (Spalding, 2016). Additionally, states such as 
California and Connecticut have conducted feasibility studies indicating that the programs can 
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break even after initial significant program investment (California Secure Choice Retirement 
Savings Investment Board,2016; Retirement Security Board, 2016).  
A few organizations, such as the Pension Rights Center, AARP, National Conference of 
State Legislatures (NCSL), and the Pew Research Center, devote several briefs and posts to 
outlining the timelines and status for state legislation. The Pension Rights Center provides a 
detailed timeline for each state tracking any legislation that has been proposed, passed, or 
implemented. Although the specificity is useful, the timelines are out of date by almost three 
years (State-based Retirement Plans for the Private Sector, 2012). NCSL possesses a more up to 
date account of state movements in this policy area, although with less explanatory detail than 
the Pension Rights Center. The AARP possesses a state retirement savings resources center that 
contains up to date information on state-run retirement plans, albeit with fewer details about the 
evolution of the policy than NCSL or the Pensions Right Center (State Retirement Savings 
Plans). Pew’s research focuses both on the prospective retirement savings produced by these 
plans as well as general employer-based retirement access across the U.S. and the continued need 
for retirement planning by states (Auto-IRAs Could Help Retirees Boost Social Security 
Payments, 2018; Employer-based Retirement Plan Access and Participation across the 50 States, 
2016). 
Georgetown University’s Center for Retirement Initiatives devotes significant resources 
to tracking the progress of state-run retirement plans and to presenting different strategic 
approaches to implementing these plans. Although the center does not allow public access to all 
of its data and reports, the accessible portion provides excellent resources regarding the elements 
of these retirement plans. The Center provides an up to date color-coded map of the U.S. 
indicating states that have enacted plans, proposed or studied plans, recently looked at plans, or 
11 
have done nothing related to such plans (State Initiatives 2019: New Programs Begin 
Implementation While Others Consider Action, 2019). The Center has also published a series of 
policy briefs regarding implementation strategies based on other state run programs, pertinent 
federal laws, retirement plan design features, and financial feasibility (Feirstein, 2016; Morse, 
2014; Rhee, 2016; State-Facilitated Retirement Savings Programs: A Snapshot of Plan Design 
Features, 2018). Details of the retirement plans vary by state. As previously mentioned, each 
state utilizes one of four different retirement plan models and the enrollment methodology and 
regulations vary per model (Miller, 2018). Additionally, each state debuts its retirement plan 
differently and can require companies to enroll at different times. For instance, Oregon is rolling 
out its retirement plan in stages, requiring progressively smaller employers to enroll until all 
employers are enrolled in the state auto-IRA plan by 2020 (Oregon Saves, 2018).  
 This area of public policy is both exhilarating and troubling to watch. The 
movement on the state level to bridge the retirement savings gap is encouraging. However, there 
is a dearth of analysis regarding the success and impact of these programs. Furthermore, there is 
little analysis about the reason so many states have researched state-run retirement plans while 
only ten of those states have enacted such plans. Clearly these public policy questions require 
further analysis. My capstone starts with the current research summarized above and analyzes the 
characteristics of the states that have started or considered these retirement plans. This will 
highlight factors that prompt a state to pursue this public policy solution. 
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The Current Project 
Data Sources 
For this capstone, I wanted to analyze how state demographic variables affected the 
states’ decisions to take action regarding state-run retirement plans. I hypothesized that income 
factors, public pension solvency, state politicians’ political affiliation, and demographics of the 
senior citizen population would be significant results. Due to a lack of research demonstrating 
any significant factors in this policy movement, I selected these types of variables as a starting 
point to gauge areas of influence. Further, I wanted to examine if the significance of these 
variables differed between a proposal or study of this policy and an enactment of this policy. The 
difference between the number of states considering state-run retirement plans and the number of 
states enacting plans indicates a factor or factors that dissuade further action. 
In order to address this hypothesis, I incorporated four types of data into my model. First, 
I used American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimate tables for the “POPULATION 60 
YEARS AND OVER IN THE UNITED STATES.” These tables record population characteristic 
estimates for the 60 years and over population of the U.S. compared to the total population of the 
U.S. I chose the 5-year estimates since these estimates were available for all eight of the years I 
analyzed and since these estimates are the most comprehensive of the ACS estimates. I 
categorized the data by state and downloaded a table for each year from 2010-2017. I then 
combined all eight tables into one ACS panel data set. The second data source I used was welfare 
data from the University of Kentucky Center on Poverty Research (UKCPR). UKCPR is a 
research center in the Gatton College of Business and Economics that annually updates a 
national panel data set. The data includes state-level data on public assistance programs, poverty, 
governor political affiliation, and political composition of state house and senate. Third, I utilized 
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Pew’s state public pension data. For this source, I only incorporated the funding ratios of public 
employee pensions in each state. I used this variable to discern if there was a significant trend in 
policy movement that corresponded with changing levels in the funding of the public pensions 
systems. See Appendix B for a complete list of variables from all three data sources along with 
their definitions. 
Lastly, I created a panel data set of state actions toward state-run retirement plans for 
2010-2017. This data required multiple resources to find records of any state activity in this area. 
The Georgetown Center for Retirement Initiatives tracks state policy movement and publishes 
annual maps of the action statuses. However, Georgetown also limits public access to their 
reports, so updates regarding state activity are largely inaccessible. Consequently, I went through 
any past research articles and memos from Georgetown to find the action statuses for previous 
years. I also utilized the legislative data that the Pew Charitable Trusts, National Conference of 
State Legislatures (NCSL), and Pension Rights Center have tracked in order to complete my 
panel data. For categorization, I used most of the same categories that Georgetown defined; 
however, for the purpose of my model, I added categories of my own: “Failed Legislation” and 
“No Further Action” replaced the “Recent Action” category that Georgetown uses. I wanted the 
categorization to be more specific in this project. I have listed the categories and their definitions 
below in Figure 1. The maps in Appendix A also use these action categories to show the spread 
of state-run retirement plans. Creating a panel data set of the action statuses then allowed for the 
merging of this data set with the ACS, pension, and UKCPR data in order to analyze what 
factors may have had a role in the movement of this policy.  
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Figure 1. Action Definitions. 
Action Definition 
No Action No legislative activity in this policy area 
Proposal / Study Legislative member proposed a study or 
legislation  
No Further Action Legislation did not proceed out of committee 
or to a vote 
Failed Legislation Legislation did proceed to a vote but the vote 
failed 
Enacted Legislation passed; a retirement plan was 
approved 
Implemented Retirement plan is ready to use and 
enrollment has begun 
 
Method of Analysis 
I merged all panel data from these four sources into one data set. Then, I estimated hazard 
models to analyze the effect of different independent variables on the time to an action. A hazard 
model estimates relationships between various factors and the time it takes for a specific event to 
happen (Albarqouni, 2018). The resulting hazard ratios of each variable indicates their effects on 
the probability of the event of interest, known as “failure,” a technical term in hazard models for 
whatever action, good or bad, is observed (Albarqouni, 2018; UCLA Institute for Digital 
Research and Education). I ran four hazard models. For all four, the dependent variable was an 
action; the unit of time was year; and the observations were states. The first and second models 
used the time to proposal or study as the dependent variable. The first model used demographic 
variables for total state populations. The second used demographic variables for the state 
population 60 years or older. The third and fourth models used the time to enactment as the 
dependent variable. The third model used demographic variables for total state populations. The 
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fourth used demographic variables for the state population 60 years or older. All four hazard 
model used the same public pension, poverty, and political variables. See Appendix B for the 
complete list of variables included in the hazard models.  
Results 
Significant results of the hazard models run are displayed below. See Appendix C for the 
complete list of results. The designation of failure refers to which action was being observed in 
the hazard model. Hazard ratios have multiplicative effects on the probability; values less than 
1.0 indicate a decrease and values greater than 1.0 indicate an increase. Consequently, the 
statistical tests are based on a null hypothesis of 1.0, instead of 0.0, as in usual regressions.  
Figure 2. Statistically Significant Results with Hazard Model with Proposal / Study as 
Failure 
Variable Hazard Ratio Standard Error Z P-Value 
Poverty_100_149percent_Total  2.374 0.826 2.48 0.013** 
povertyrate 0.812 0.097 -1.75 0.080* 
governorisdemocrat1yes  2.487 1.112 2.04 0.042** 
*Indicates significance at the 90% confidence level 
**Indicates significance at the 95% confidence level 
 
The majority of variables included in this analysis were not statistically significant predictors of 
legislative action. However, three results were significant for the Proposal / Study Model: the 
governor’s political affiliation, the poverty rate, and the percentage of the population living at an 
income level between 100-149% of the poverty level. The hazard ratio for the governor’s 
political affiliation indicates that having a democratic governor is associated with a 2.5 factor 
increase in probability of a state-run retirement plan being proposed or studied. Thus, states with 
democratic governor are much more likely to see legislation proposed in this policy area. The 
hazard ratio for the percentage of the population between 100-149% of the poverty level 
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indicates that for a 1% increase in this population there is a 2.4 factor increase in probability of a 
state-run retirement plan being proposed or studied. This indicates that states with higher 
portions of their populations living at this income level would more likely see this sort of 
legislation proposed. The hazard ratio for the poverty rate indicates that a 1% increase decreased 
the probability of this policy action occurring by a factor of 0.8. This indicates that states with 
overall poorer populations were less likely to see legislation proposed in this area.  
Figure 3. Statistically Significant Results with Hazard Model with Enacted as Failure 
Variable Hazard Ratio Standard Error Z P-Value 
Poverty_100_149percent_Total  8.686 9.460 1.98 0.047** 
Poverty_100percent_Total  0.171 0.143 -2.12 0.034** 
**Indicates significance at the 95% confidence level 
For the hazard model estimated with the Enacted status, only the population living below 
150% of the poverty level was significant. A 1% increase in the population living between 100% 
and 149% increased the probability of enactment by a factor of 8.7. Conversely, a 1% increase in 
the population living below 100% decreased the probability of enactment by a factor of 0.2. 
These results suggests that states with larger populations between 100-149% of the poverty level 
are eight times more likely than other states to enact state-run retirement plans. Given the low 
hazard ratio, states with larger populations below 100% of the poverty level are only slightly less 
likely to enact these plans compared to other states.  
These models were also estimated using the same category of variables listed in 
Appendix B for the 60 years and over population. These models tested the hypothesis that the 
aging population characteristics would have a significant effect on action in this policy area. 
However, little statistical significance was found by this data analysis method. Only one factor 
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was statistically significant when the model was run with the Proposal / Study action, and no 
factors were statistically significant when the model was run with the Enacted action.  
Figure 4. Hazard Model with Proposal / Study as Failure for 60 Years and Older 
Population 
Variable Hazard Ratio Standard Error Z P-Value 
Education_HSorGED_60yrs  0.862 0.0568 -2.25 0.025** 
**Indicates significance at the 95% confidence level 
This one significant variable indicated that a 1% increase in the 60 or older population 
with some high school education decreased the probability of this policy action by a factor of 
0.862. There may be other variables for this population that are significant, but if so, they are 
outside of the scope of the data used in this capstone.  
Analysis and Implications 
These models indicated that, in general, education levels, types of household income, 
number of senior citizens, and public assistance program participation do not have a significant 
effect on the interest or legislative initiation of state-run retirement plans. Instead, the presence of 
a Democratic governor and levels of poverty affect the initial movement of this policy. In terms 
of enacting state-run retirement plans, political affiliation appears to play an even smaller role, 
since only poverty levels appeared to be statistically significant. This could speak to the good 
intentions of the policy, since it is designed to incentivize retirement savings for private sector 
employees who need to save for retirement but do not have the means to do so financially or 
through their employer. This could mean that social need is genuinely driving the policy process 
for these plans rather than partisanship.  
The significance of these two variables is important to note: both poverty level variables 
are significant, but they have opposite effects on the probability of policy movement. This could 
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indicate that the population living below 100% of the poverty level lives in such extreme poverty 
that policymakers prioritize other programs, such as social service programs, instead of 
retirement programs. The decrease in probability affected by the poverty rate indicates this as 
well; higher poverty rates could force state governments to focus on ways to provide shelter, 
food, and jobs rather than retirement savings. At the same time, the effect of the population 
living at 100 to 149% of the poverty level indicates that this population is the target population 
for this policy. GAO’s testimony, referenced in the literature review, emphasized the lack of 
access to lower-income workers (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5.  Workers’ Access to Employer-Sponsored Retirement Plans by Income Level, 
2012 
 
This lack of access is especially prominent for earners of $31,176 or less who are earning close 
to the Federal poverty level. Figure 6 (see below) indicates the poverty levels for the years 
analyzed in the capstone and the 100% and 149% levels of those guidelines.  
Figure 6. 100% and 149% of the Federal Poverty Guidelines for 2010-2017. 
Year First Person-
100% 
Four-Person 
Family-100% 
First Person--
149% 
Four-Person 
Family--149% 
2017 $12,060.00 $24,600.00 $  17,969.40 $  36,654.00 
2016 $11,880.00 $24,300.00 $  17,701.20 $  36,207.00 
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2015 $11,770.00 $24,250.00  $ 17,537.30 $  36,132.50 
2014 $11,670.00 $23,850.00 $  17,388.30 $  35,536.50 
2013 $11,490.00 $23,550.00 $  17,120.10  $  35,089.50 
2012 $11,170.00 $23,050.00 $  16,643.30 $  34,344.50 
2011 $10,890.00 $22,350.00 $  16,226.10 $  33,301.50 
2010 $10,830.00 $22,050.00 $  16,136.70 $  32,854.50 
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Service 
All of the 100% and 149% of the poverty level figures exist in the bottom three quartiles of the 
worker income levels in Figure 4. That means that the majority of individuals in the 149% of the 
poverty level have much lower access to employer-provided retirement plans and would benefit 
the most from state-run retirement plans. The statistical significance of this variable in the hazard 
models therefore indicates the role of this population in the policy making process.  
Not many demographic variables regarding seniors were found to be statistically 
significant. Only one education attainment factor was significant in the Proposal / Study phase of 
this policy movement, and none were significant in the movement toward enacting these plans. 
The presence of this factor in the first action, and its effective decrease on the probability of 
action, could indicate that state governments prioritize other programming over retirement plans 
in the presence of this population. Since these workers or retirees are 60 and older, they may rely 
significantly on Social Security and other forms of assistance. State-run retirement plans would 
not help this population; medical programs, community interaction, and income assistance would 
benefit this population more. So, the decrease in probability related to this section of the 
population makes sense. The low potential impact of state-run retirement plans on the 60 and 
older population could also explain the lack of significance of other variables. A significant shift 
in available retirement plans would have minimal impact on persons close to that age because 
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there is very limited investment income they could acquire from participating in such plans. This 
would in turn indicate that this is a long-term retirement solution policy rather than a short-term 
fix. This is a positive aspect of the policy design.  
In terms of political influences, the political affiliations of a state’s government appeared 
to have minimal impact. The governor’s political affiliation did have an impact in initiating any 
legislative activity regarding this policy. However, the impact does not seem to have an effect on 
enacting a policy. This could indicate that while a governor can marshal initial support and 
interest for state-run retirement plans, their political influence is not enough to support this 
measure. Rather, other factors must be in place for the plan to be enacted in the state. 
Interestingly, the composition of the state legislature did not have a significant effect in any of 
these models. Variables for members of both parties in the state legislature were included, but 
the results were not statistically significant. This could imply that this policy is bipartisan in 
nature. Since this policy’s goal is to encourage private savings, rather than generate government 
funds or further government programs, there is credence to this analysis.  
Limitations 
Though this study has important strengths, its limitations should also be considered. First, 
the sample size for this project is fairly small; if more states enact state-run retirement plans in 
the future, it will be easier to study characterizations and motivations at work. Also, there are 
several additional statistical methods that could be used to analyze this data, as well as other data 
and factors that could be considered. This is a project that could be monitored and studied for 
years, and continual data analysis would yield better eventual results. Due to limited literature 
available on state-run retirement plans, it is difficult to determine the influence of political 
factors such as prominent political actors, issue framing, and national organizations. 
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Furthermore, the time frame of the capstone limits the amount of research on political factors. 
Research that focuses on the influence of political factors would provide better estimations of 
their roles. Additionally, this project is not predictive of a plan’s success. That is neither the 
purpose of this project nor a byproduct. There is not enough data available on the 
implementation of these programs to perform a program evaluation, and this capstone cannot 
serve as a substitute. Future research should evaluate these programs in order to properly address 
current concern regarding these programs. At this point in the state policy process, one can only 
analyze what may have motivated states to move forward with these retirement policies.  
Conclusion 
 Further research on state-run retirement plans is needed. This is a burgeoning area of 
state policy, and much analysis should be done in order to assist state governments in 
determining the need and applicability of these plans. The findings in this paper demonstrate this 
policy process is not solely driven by any political body or single portion of the population. 
Rather, it is driven by the presence of residents who face a scarcity of resources and who could 
be positively affected by this retirement planning. Further research should analyze whether this 
continues as more states enact state-run retirement plans. Additionally, the effects of these 
retirement plans should be evaluated once more data is available.  
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Appendix A - Maps of State-Run Retirement Plan Statuses by Year  
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Appendix B - Variables Used in Hazard Models 
 
Variable Label 
ActFundedRatio_GASB Funding Ratio for State Public Pension Fund 
Education_BAorhigher_Total  Population Percentage with a Bachelor’s or 
Higher 
Education_HSorGED_Total  Population Percentage that Completed all or 
Part of High School 
Income_householdsSNAP_Total  Population Percentage Receiving SNAP 
Benefits 
Income_householdsSSI_Total  Population Percentage Receiving SSI Benefits 
Income_householdsearnings_Total  Population Percentage Receiving Wage 
Earnings 
Poverty_100_149percent_Total  Population Percentage Between 100-149% of 
the Federal Poverty Level 
Poverty_100percent_Total Population Percentage Below 100% of the 
Federal Poverty Level 
Unemploymentrate  State Unemployment Rate 
gsp_60s  Gross State Product in $1,000,000 units 
povertyrate  State Poverty Rate 
governorisdemocrat1yes  Governor’s Political Party Affiliation 
ssirec_60s  Number of SSI Recipients per State in 
1,000,000 units 
 numberinlowerhousedemocrat  Number of Democrats in the Lower House in 
the State Legislature 
numberinlowerhouserepublican  Number of Republicans in the Lower House 
in the State Legislature 
numberinupperhousedemocrat  Number of Democrats in the Upper House in 
the State Legislature 
numberinupperhouserepublican  Number of Republicans in the Upper House in 
the State Legislature 
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Appendix C - Results of Hazard Models 
 
Hazard Model 1 - Proposal / Study as “Failure” for State Population Totals 
Variable Hazard 
Ratio 
Standard 
Error 
Z P-Value 
ActFundedRatio_GASB 0.490    0.849     -0.41    0.680       
Education_BAorhigher_Total  1.043    0.120    0.36 0.717      
Education_HSorGED_Total  1.008     0.114      0.06      0.954      
Income_householdsSNAP_Total  0.852    0.098 -1.38   0.168      
Income_householdsSSI_Total  0.780  0.178  -1.09     0.277     
Income_householdsearnings_Total  0.816     0.234   -0.71      0.478      
Poverty_100_149percent_Total  2.374      0.826    2.48    0.013      
Unemploymentrate  1.259     0.351     0.83    0.409       
gsp_60s  0.815    1.836      -0.09       0.928      
povertyrate  0.812   0.097 -1.75  0.080 
governorisdemocrat1yes  2.487   1.112   2.04    0.042      
ssirec_60s  5.597    24.663  0.39  0.696      
numberinlowerhousedemocrat  1.014  0.011    1.26     0.207      
numberinlowerhouserepublican  0.996    0.010   -0.45     0.651   
numberinupperhousedemocrat  0.975    0.033   -0.74      0.458      
numberinupperhouserepublican  1.008 0.036   0.21       0.833      
 
Hazard Model 2 - Proposal / Study as “Failure” for State Population 60 or Older 
Variable Hazard 
Ratio 
Standard 
Error 
Z P-Value 
ActFundedRatio_GASB 0.318  0.482   -0.76  0.450      
35 
Education_HSorGED_60years  0.862     0.057  -2.25         0.025      
Income_householdsSNAP_60years 0.869       0.102 -1.20      0.232      
Income_householdsSSI_60years 0.918 0.151 -0.52    0.605      
Income_householdsearnings_60years 0.808  0.112 -1.53     0.126      
Poverty_100_149percent_60years  1.337      0.453    0.86        0.391      
Poverty_100percent_60years  0.738 0.219 -1.02  0.306      
Unemploymentrate  1.143     0.332         0.46    0.647      
gsp_60s  14.996  31.747    1.28       0.201      
povertyrate  0.917        0.124 -0.64  0.521      
governorisdemocrat1yes  2.035 0.955  1.51       0.130      
ssirec_60s  0.076       0.309 -0.64     0.525      
numberinlowerhousedemocrat  1.015 0.011    1.40      0.162      
numberinlowerhouserepublican  0.992    0.011  -0.76    0.445      
numberinupperhousedemocrat  0.974        0.034  -0.76    0.450      
numberinupperhouserepublican  1.037       0.037   1.03        0.304      
 
Hazard Model 3 - Enacted as “Failure” for State Population Totals 
Variable Hazard 
Ratio 
Standard 
Error 
Z P-Value 
ActFundedRatio_GASB 0.089  0.354  -0.61        0.543      
Education_BAorhigher_Total  1.074 0.263  0.29       0.771      
Education_HSorGED_Total  0.936    0.221 -0.28       0.781      
Income_householdsSNAP_Total  1.195 0.347 0.61      0.540      
Income_householdsSSI_Total  0.980  0.539 -0.04    0.971      
Income_householdsearnings_Total  0.873  0.591 -0.20       0.841      
36 
Poverty_100_149percent_Total  8.686 9.460 1.98 0.047 
Poverty_100percent_Total 0.171 0.143 -2.12 0.034 
Unemploymentrate  1.016 0.718    0.02  0.98 
gsp_60s  16.145    80.053 0.56        0.575      
povertyrate  1.351     0.441  0.92    0.356      
governorisdemocrat1yes  4.204  4.861 1.24     0.214      
ssirec_60s  0.055       0.530   -0.30   0.762      
numberinlowerhousedemocrat  1.006 0.017  0.34     0.735      
numberinlowerhouserepublican  1.004 0.014 0.31    0.757      
numberinupperhousedemocrat  0.984   0.065 -0.24     0.808      
numberinupperhouserepublican  1.051  0.077 0.69       0.491      
 
Hazard Model 4 - Enacted as “Failure” for State Population 60 or Older 
Variable Hazard 
Ratio 
Standard 
Error 
Z P-Value 
ActFundedRatio_GASB 0.952   3.434 -0.01     0.989      
Education_BAorhigher_60yrs  1.070    0.240   0.30   0.763      
Education_HSorGED_60years  0.890       0.172 -0.60       0.547      
Income_householdsSNAP_60years 0.924 0.222 -0.33        0.740      
Income_householdsSSI_60years 1.077     0.360    0.22   0.825      
Income_householdsearnings_60years 1.081 0.277 0.30     0.762      
Poverty_100_149percent_60years  1.605 0.963 0.79  0.431      
Poverty_100percent_60years  0.604   0.422 -0.72     0.470      
Unemploymentrate  1.101 0.734 0.14       0.885      
gsp_60s  4.191 18.026 0.33  0.739      
povertyrate  1.040      0.331    0.12     0.902       
37 
governorisdemocrat1yes  1.935   2.145   0.60    0.552      
ssirec_60s  0.170 1.466 -0.21    0.837      
numberinlowerhousedemocrat  1.011 0.017 0.63   0.526      
numberinlowerhouserepublican  1.001 1.013 0.08     0.940      
numberinupperhousedemocrat  1.001 0.062 0.02  0.982      
numberinupperhouserepublican  1.047 0.070    0.68   0.495      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
